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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dodge (1918) 246 U. S. 357 and New
York Life Insurance Co. v. Head (1914) 234 U. S. 149 there was the same
holding when the Missouri courts attempted to apply a nonforfeiture statute
in spite of the fact that the loans under which the insurer claimed forfeiture
were made in New York. See Comment, 19 St. Louis Law Rev. 348. Al-
though the above mentioned cases all involve insurance policies there is no
apparent reason why the principle announced cannot be applied to the
problem as a whole. The general application of such a principle would be
in accord with Cordozo's statement that "The fundamental public policy is
perceived to be that rights lawfully vested shall be everywhere maintained."
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York (1918) 224 N. Y. 99, at 113, 120
N. E. 198, at 202. This treatment of the problem might also bring about
the desired result that the rights of parties would be the same in every
jurisdiction, and the result of an action would not depend upon the forum
in which it is brought. See Beach, Uniform Enforcement of Vested Rights,
(1918) 27 Yale L. J. 656. Had due weight been attached to these considera-
tions the principal case might easily have been decided otherwise.
W. C. S. '35.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DuE PROCESS-CONTRACTS WITH GOVERNMENT As
PROPERTY.-Plaintiff brought an action in a Federal District Court as bene-
ficiary of an insurance policy issued by the United States Government
pursuant to the War Risk Insurance Act of 1917, c. 105, art. 4, secs. 400-
405 (40 Stat. 409). The United States demurred to the petition on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction, contending that the consent of
the United States to be sued on the policy, expressly granted in the above
Act, had been withdrawn by an Act of 1933, c. 3, (48 Stat. 8), commonly
called the Economy Act (38 U. S. C. sees. 701 et seq.), proporting to repeal
"all laws granting or pertaining to yearly renewable term insurance..."
(Ibid. sec. 717). The plaintiff claimed that this Act deprived him of prop-
erty without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The District court sustained the demurrer. On writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States;-Held: Reversed.
War Risk Insurance policies are valid contracts with the United States, and
as such create vested rights, and are property within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment. The due process clause prohibits the United States from
annulling them. But the rule that the United States may not be sued with-
out its consent is all-embracing. This consent creates a revocable privilege,
and its withdrawal would not necessarily imply a repudiation of the con-
tractual obligation, since Congress may direct its fulfillment without the
interposition of either a court or an administrative tribunal, so long as the
obligation is recognized. However, the language of the Economy Act, and
other collateral evidence, clearly shows that Congress intended to destroy
the right, and not merely the remedy, hence the Act is unconstitutional for
the reason alleged. Lynch v. U. S. (1934) 292 U. S. 571.
A valid contract with the United States, enforceable only at the discretion
of Congress, is nevertheless a vested right and constitutes property within
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the "due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. What is a legal right? Can it exist without a remedy?
In the Roman law every legal right was a composite of three indispensa-
ble elements; 1) legal capacity in the subject by whom it was exercised, 2)
legal control over the subject with reference to which it was exercised, and
3) a legal authority involved in the sanction,.or remedy, by which its valid-
ity was insured. Morey, Outlines of Roman Law (1913) p. 224. The
Roman law did not confuse the idea of contract with the idea of the obliga-
tion resulting therefrom. The "contractus" itself was not the "right"; it
was the transaction by which a right and a duty were legally established.
Op. cit. p. 352. The legal existence of a right depended upon its protection
by the State; and if the right itself was not protected from invasion, or if
there was no means of redress in case of infringement, it had properly no
legal character or significance. Op. cit. p. 387. See Declareuil, Rome the
Law-Giver (1926) p. 191: Sandar, Institutes of Justinian (1876) pp. 396,
398, 403: MacKeldey, Roman Law (1883) Div. I, arts. 10-14, pp. 4-5. It is
clear from the above authorities that in the Roman law there was no such
"rara avis" as a legal right without a legal remedy.
At an early date in the history of American jurisprudence a difference
was discovered between the obligation of a contract and the remedy pro-
vided by law for its enforcement. The distinction probably originated from
a remark of Ch. J. Marshall: "The distinction . . . has been taken at bar,
and exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the obligation of a
contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation
may direct." Sturgis v. Crowninshield (1819) 4 Wheat. 112, 200. How-
ever, state statutes which either substantially impair, or totally destroy the
remedy of a contract, are void and unconstitutional as violative of the "im-
pairment of the obligation of contract" clause of the United States Con-
stitution. Johnson v. Bond (1847) 13 Fed. Cases 7, 374, 1 Hempst. 533;
Bruce v. Schuyler (1847) 9 Ill. (4 Gilm.) 221; Robinson v. Magee (1858)
9 Cal. 81; Planter's Bank v. Sharp (1848) 6 How. 301; La. ex rel. Nelson
v. St. Martin's Parish (1884) 11 U. S. 716; Barnitz v. Beverly (1896) f63
U. S. 118. "The obligation of contract exists generally 'in foro legis' and
'in foro conscientiae'. The constitutional prohibition as to the impairment
of the obligation of contract refers clearly to the former . . . since a right
without a legal remedy ceases to be a legal right; and legislation destroying
the remedy would reduce a legal and moral right to a moral right only.
Such a law is as unconstitutional as one affecting the (legal) right in the
same manner, for 'in foro legis' the effects of both are the same." Johnson
v. Duncan (1815) 3 Mart. (La.) 1530. The only logical conclusion is that
a remedy is an inseparable attribute of a contractual right when considered
under Art. I, see. 10, of the United States Constitution. By what juristic
prestidigitation does the same right lose this attribute when affected by the
Fifth Amendment?
"The contracts between a Nation and an individual are binding only on
the conscience of the sovereign and have no pretensions to compulsive force.
They confer no right of action indpendent of the sovereign will." Hamilton,
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Federalist, No. 81. Cf. Principality of Monaco v. Miss. (1934) 292 U. S.
313. This is certainly a true statement of the principle of governmental
immunity from suit.
Unquestionably, Congress cannot be required to provide remedies against
the Government upon its "contracts". And yet in the Sinking Fund Cases
(1878) 99 U. S. 700, 718, the court said: "The United States cannot any
more than the states interfere with private rights . . . and are as much
bound by their contracts as individuals.. .. All this is indisputable." See
Burdick, Law of the Constitution (1922) p. 413; U. S. v. Mo. Pac. R. Co.
(1921) 256 U. S. 51. The statement is absurd upon its face. The courts,
having distinguished between the right and the remedy, repeatedly confuse
the concepts of the moral and the legal right. What the court meant was
that the United States and the individual are as much bound "in foro con-
scientiae" only. It is obvious that the individual alone is bound "in foro
legis."
Since the obligation of the United States on its contracts is only a moral
obligation, the right, the extinction of which by Congress is now said to
constitute a deprivation of property under the Fifth Amendment, is at most
a possibly ill-founded expectancy that Congress will discharge the sovereign
conscience. Even assuming the infallible integrity of Congress in the per-
formance of these duties, the fact of judicial unenforceability, apart from
statute, emasculates the legal obligation. The Fifth Amendment has not
been construed to cast affirmative duties upon Congress in this regard.
The decision is explainable only in the light of the Court's views of sound
public policy. The opinion in the principal case lends substance to the
legally empty right against the sovereign in a situation where a remedy
has once been afforded, in order to circumvent the logical consequence of
the rule that immunity from suit is a sovereign prerogative. Thus a debit
on the conscience of Congress miraculously becomes property within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. This theory, however deliriously illogi-
cal, has a method in its madness. It represents a signal triumph of prag-
matic thought over medieval doctrines and syllogistic formulae, and vindi-
cates the cogent epigram of Justice Holmes that "a page of history is worth
a volume of logic." A. J. B., '36.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CONTRACT CLAUSE-EMERGENCY-ExEMPTION OF
INSURANCE BENEFITS FROM JUDICIAL PRocEss.-Defendant, beneficiary of a
life insurance policy, was indebted to plaintiff on a judgment for rent.
Subsequently insured died, a writ of garnishment was served on the pro-
ceeds of the policy, and was dismissed pursuant to the provisions of an Act
of the Legislature of Arkansas (Act 102, Laws of 1933), passed after the
service of the writ, that all moneys payable to residents as beneficiaries of
life and accident insurance should be exempt from seizure under judicial
process for payment of any debt by contract or otherwise. Held: Reversed,
the law being an impairment of the obligation of contracts under Art. I,
see. 10 of the U. S. Constitution, and remanded for reinstatement of the
writ. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas (1934) 292 U. S. 426.
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